





As Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was responsible for the greatest
period of deregulation in modem British history. In this Essay, Clint
Bolick examines how Thatcher engineered this phenomenal transformation.
In doing so, he draws lessons from the British experience for deregulatory
innovation elsewhere.
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Introduction
Margaret Thatcher presided as prime minister over arguably the
greatest national transformation to occur in a half-century without a
change in the form of government. She replaced an increasingly socialist
economy with free enterprise, re-igniting engines of productivity that had
grown rusty from decades of state ownership and control. More
significantly, she replenished the spirit of a once-great nation that had
fallen into the throes of complacency and despair.
Thatcher has been out of office for five years' and she might not win
a popularity contest in Great Britain if one were held today. The same
iron-willed determination that made it possible for her to usher through
the most sweeping reforms in modern British history also alienated her
from many voters-though respected by everyone, Thatcher did not inspire
affection in all quarters.'
Yet her legacy remains intact: socialism seems permanently
vanquished, a new generation of Conservatives plans further advances
against the welfare state, and even the opposition Labour Party now
concedes basic premises about the virtues of markets and
individualism-premises that were heretical a scant sixteen years ago.
Whatever judgment her contemporaries may pass upon her, history no
doubt will assign Margaret Thatcher status as one of the twentieth
century's great revolutionaries.
Though all revolutions are ultimately unique in their historical
circumstances, lessons of more general applicability may be extracted
from them and put to use carefully in other contexts. Thatcher's
experiences are instructive for those seeking to bring about fundamental
economic and social change. This Essay will examine the challenges she
faced, the principles and strategies she used to meet them, and the applica-
tion of those principles and strategies to her particular circumstances. I
shall then assess the results of her efforts, and synthesize some broadly
applicable lessons from the Thatcher Revolution.
1. Mrs. Thatcher was elected prime minister in May 1979, and resigned on November
28, 1990.
2. Shortly after her resignation, polls found that 74% of British respondents agreed
that Thatcher should have resigned, while 26% believed she should have stayed on. Yet by
a 59%-34% margin, they concluded on balance that Thatcher was good for Britain. 26%
rated Thatcher the greatest post-World War II prime minister (second only to Winston
Churchill, who garnered 35 % of the vote). Major Movement in Britain?, AM. ENTERPRISE,




I. The Stuff of Revolutions
The word "revolution" is cast about almost casually these days-and
any time a word is overused, its currency is reduced. So when I use the
term "revolution" to describe Margaret Thatcher's eleven and a half years
as prime minister, I want to do so with clarity and precision. Obvious
measures such as public opinion polling and economic indicators, while
important, are often superficial and fleeting. A real revolution is systemic
and enduring. With that in mind, I offer the following criteria against
which the success of a social, economic, or political revolution might be
measured:
(1) The extent to which the relationship between the individual and
the state, as well as the individual's way of thinking about that
relationship, are fundamentally changed.
(2) The extent to which the revolution institutionalizes itself, taking
hold in the hearts and minds of the people, and shifts the very terms
and center of the debate, so that a return to the status quo ante is
impossible.
(3) The extent to which ideas and changes that were previously
unthinkable are now possible, and a new generation of thinkers and
leaders is inspired to pursue those ideas.
In these terms, as the following pages will show, the Thatcher regime
holds up well as one of the great revolutions of modern times.
II. Stark Challenges
The Great Britain Thatcher encountered when she assumed the
position of prime minister in 1979 was morally dispirited and mired in
economic quicksand. Its nationalized industries were bloated and
inefficient, demanding ever-heavier public subsidies because of declining
productivity. The country was wracked by constant labor turmoil, with
violent strikes and long interruptions of essential services. Massive
portions of the British population were dependent on the state for their
housing, education, and livelihoods; those engaged in productive pursuits
were saddled with a crushing tax burden. Most distressing of all was that
many Britons seemed resigned to accept this as the permanent' state of
affairs.
That year inflation raged at eighteen percent, and minimum lending
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rates were seventeen percent. 3 The British pound sank to one-twentieth
the purchasing power it had forty years earlier. Tax rates on earned
income ranged up to eighty-three percent. 4 The public sector played an
ever-larger role in British life: of the 25 million people who were
employed, 29.3% worked for government or nationalized industries.
Public sector corporations had accumulated debts of £27 billion (£55
billion measured in 1990 pounds sterling). This debt grew ten percent the
next year, and these corporations absorbed £4.6 billion in taxpayer
subsidies that same year.' Meanwhile, nearly a third of all housing units
were rented from public agencies.
Regardless which party was in power, industrial policy was made
informally during discussions over "beer and sandwiches" at Number 10
Downing Street, among representatives of the Trade Unions Congress,
the Confederation of British Industry, and the government, whose
decisions were ratified by Parliament.7 Labor unions held a tight grip
over the country; indeed, fifty-five percent of all workers were members
of labor unions. By 1979, the number of days lost to strikes had grown
eight to nine times compared to the years just before World War II,8 and
massive annual wage increases had fueled inflation.9
Against this dismal status quo the Conservative Party had proved
impotent. It began to abdicate its free enterprise principles even before
the end of World War II, when the Tory Reform Committee called for
government management of the economy as the means to bring the "old
tug of war between capital and labour" to "a happy draw." The party's
manifesto embraced the Industrial Charter, which endorsed nationalization
of major industries, the expansion of a social welfare state, and massive
public spending.' 0
A succession of alternating Labour and Conservative governments
produced what Keith Joseph called a "socialist ratchet." As Thatcher
explains in her autobiography, "Labour moved Britain towards more
statism; the Tories stood pat; and the next Labour Government moved the
country a little further left. The Tories loosened the corset of socialism;
they never removed it."" The movement toward ever-larger government
3. HUGO YOUNG, THE IRON LADY 192 (1989).
4. SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN, THE ANATOMY OF THATCHERISM 91-93 (1992); A
Singular Prime Minister, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 1989, at 19-20.
5. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 89-90.
6. Id. at 93.
7. Id. at 90.
8. Id.
9. See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 192.
10. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 55-56.




The 1970 election seemed to mark a turning point, as surprise
Conservative victor Edward Heath promised to "change the course and
the history of this nation. "12 Though he initiated some deregulation, labor
unrest and economic instability led to a "U-turn" during 1971-72, in
which the government engaged in sweeping economic intervention
including nationalization of the Rolls-Royce aero-engines division;
subsidies to other failing industries; and controls on wages, prices, and
dividends. As historian Hugo Young recounts, this U-turn "became a
seminal event in the history of late-twentieth-century conservatism." It
"took on the status of a demon," personified by Heath, who was viewed
as having "surrendered his belief to short-term expediency, cav[ed] in to
pressure he should have resisted, and betray[ed] the principles on which
the election had been fought and won." 3 In any event, the actions failed
to reverse Heath's fortunes, and he was swept from power in 1974.
The Labour Party, though, fared little better, ruling for five
tumultuous years that culminated in a series of destructive strikes during
the "winter of discontent" of 1978-79. That spring, Margaret Thatcher,
the woman who a few years earlier had ousted Heath as opposition leader,
replaced James Callaghan as prime minister. A shopkeeper's daughter
trained in chemistry and law and first elected to Parliament in 1958 at age
thirty-two, Thatcher had served fairly inauspiciously as Secretary of State
for Education and Science in the Heath government, where her main claim
to fame was the axing of "free" milk for every child in school-hence the
nickname "Margaret Thatcher-Milk Snatcher."
Hugo Young characterizes her ascension to the party chairmanship
in 1975 as "a mistake that should never have happened": the party was
thirsting for an outsider who could make a break from the failed politics
of the recent past. Boldly throwing her hat into the ring, Thatcher did not
campaign as revolutionary; yet as a woman and one who had never served
in the inner sanctum, Thatcher was positioned fill the political vacuum.' 4
Though little in her background hinted at what was to come, the
confluence of her remarkable leadership qualities, the dire economic
conditions, and a carefully-drawn tactical framework thrust the new prime
minister into the role of modern revolutionary.
12. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 66.
13. Id. at 75.
14. See id. at 100-01.
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III. The Seeds of Revolution
A major distinction between Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher,
both elected on platforms calling for radical change, was that Thatcher
had, in the words of one observer, "the backing of an intellectual
revolution." 5 The Thatcher Revolution traced its genesis to 1957, with
the founding of the Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA), a classical-liberal
think-tank,' 6 by Sir Antony Fisher, Britain's Frank Perdue.' 7 IEA
commissioned papers on such wide-ranging issues as rent control,
education, pollution, and social services. As historian Shirley Robin
Letwin recounts, "Writers were directed to examine everything 'ab initio'
and without regard to what is 'politically possible."" 8
Following two disastrous election defeats in 1974, many in the
Conservative Party immersed themselves in soul-searching. As Hugo
Young describes it, "Philosophy was the word. What first ensued was an
examination of ideas. . . .What they were anxious to establish . . . had
more to do with first principles than specific policies. "'9 Thatcher's close
friend and intellectual mentor, Sir Keith Joseph, introduced her to the
IEA,20 and she found there and in the works of Friedrich Hayek, Milton
Friedman, James Buchanan, and other free-market economists what she
was looking for. "We must have an ideology," she remarked. "The other
side have got an ideology they can test their policies against. We must
have one as well." 21
Joseph and Thatcher launched the Centre for Policy Studies to
develop policy alternatives based on market principles, and the new think-
tank assumed a leading role in development of Conservative Party
policies.22 As Hugo Young observes, the prominence of intellectuals in
Thatcher's inner circle "was testimony to an attempted revolution of the
public mind." Thatcher was "not herself an intellectual," Young remarks,
for her mind was suited "not to the pondering of problems but to the
discovery of solutions. "23 This combination of bold, new ideas and the
15. Id. at 79.
16. Classical liberalism embraces a free-market economy and the belief that the state
exists to protect the inalienable rights of individuals.
17. The role of the IEA and other think-tanks is examined in RICHARD COCKETT,
THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: THINK-TANKS AND THE ECONOMIC COUNTER-REVOLUTION,
1931-1983 (1994).
18. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 81.
19. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 102.
20. See id. at 86-87.
21. Id. at 406-07.
22. See id. at 86.
23. Id. at 407-08.
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means of implementing them appeared just what the party needed in the
elections of 1979.
IV. Simple Truths
Margaret Thatcher was able to synthesize these intellectual
foundations into essential themes that spoke to the crises facing the British
people. As Young observes, Thatcher "established herself as a leader,
with a philosophy [that] most people could understand."24 This allowed
Thatcher to bypass an often hostile press and take her populist message
directly to the people.
For Thatcher, the task was simple, yet vital: "It was the job of
government to establish a framework of stability-whether constitutional
stability, the rule of law, or the economic stability provided by sound
money-within which individual families and businesses were free to
pursue their own dreams and ambitions."5 She tested these themes at
her first party conference as opposition leader:
Let me give you my vision: a man's right to work as he will, to
spend what he earns, to own property, to have the state as
servant and not as master: these are the British inheritance. They
are the essence of a free country, and on that freedom all our
other freedoms depend.26
Her analysis of the condition in England was keen, guided as it was
by the insights of her closest advisor, Keith Joseph. Joseph, in assessing
Heath's electoral defeat in 1974, had concluded that the Conservative
government had failed to break out of the socialist mold established by
its post-war predecessors: "For thirty years, the private sector of our
economy has been forced to work with one hand tied behind its back by
government and unions. "27 No longer would that be the case. First and
foremost, Thatcher vowed to put an end to tripartite policymaking over
beer and sandwiches. "Why should there have been such meetings?"
Thatcher later asked. "I took the view that it was not for government,
business, and the unions to sort everything out. That was the task of the
government and Parliament."2"
24. Id. at 102.
25. THATCHER, supra note 11, at 14.
26. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 103-04.
27. Id. at 78.
28. Frederic Smoler, A Revolutionary Defense of the 1980s, AUDACITY, Spring 1984,
at 4, 8.
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That meant re-establishing a rule of law, a theme Thatcher
emphasized constantly. "There can be no freedom without law," Thatcher
declared, "there can only be the power of the strong to oppress the
weak." 29 And it meant giving people greater control and responsibility
over their lives.
This message resounded among many in Britain who, as Letwin
observes, had come to believe "there was indeed a British disease, a
malignancy that needed removal, a malaise that needed a cure." 30
Thatcher identified the root cause as socialism. "Britain and socialism are
not the same thing," she declared, "and as long as I have health and
strength they never will be."'"
Thatcher bluntly repudiated the politics of the past. When asked if
her call for housing privatization could be placed on the table in the
interest of coalitionism, she replied, "No. My policies are not
negotiable." 32 When Heath demanded a return to consensus politics,
Thatcher asserted that consensus could be achieved only by "abandoning
all beliefs, principles and values. . . .Whoever won a battle under the
banner 'I Stand for Consensus'?"33
Thatcher's populist message of patriotism and pocket-book economics
enabled the Conservative Party to make major inroads among working-
class voters .3  Although winning a fairly slender but working
parliamentary majority of forty-three, Thatcher had managed through her
clear statement of principles to establish a governing mandate. The
election "was not a routine political shift but the assembling of a critical
mass of popular support behind the Thatcherite appeal for radical change,"
writes Hugo Young. "This time, not only a Labour government but
socialism itself seemed to have been comprehensively defeated."
3 5
V. Inflation, Taxes, and the Rule of Law
"The only really important thing," the new prime minister said to
Cecil Parkinson, party chairman and cabinet minister under Thatcher, "is
29. Id. at 9.
30. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 89.
31. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 103-04.
32. Id. at 90-91.
33. Id. at 224.
34. PETER JENKINS, MRS. THATCHER'S REVOLUTION: THE END OF THE SOCIALIST
ERA xiii (1988).
35. YOUNG, supra note 4, at 136.
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to do what you said you'd do." 36 The first step was to gain control over
the government. Parkinson sized up the challenge:
The bureaucracy picked up very quickly that things were going
to happen, and that they were wasting their time trying to defend
the indefensible. You've got to establish very early on that that
is your position, because otherwise they will prevaricate, they
will delay, they will block, in the happy assurance that you're
a bird of passage-you come, you go, they go on forever. And
so this specific commitment-the knowledge that whatever you
say is going to happen-is absolutely essential. If you don't,
we're back to the inertia of the status quo.37
Thatcher from the beginning demonstrated her resolve. Thatcher acted
immediately in the 1979 budget to cut taxes, slashing the standard rate
from thirty-three percent to thirty percent, and the top rate (which she
decried as a "symbol of British socialism-the symbol of envy") from
eighty-three percent to sixty percent, the first of several reductions. She
cut public spending by three percent.38 Thatcher also moved quickly to
curb regulations of the economy, ending wage, price, and dividend
controls; curtailing other central planning devices and controls on currency
exchange; 39 and establishing enterprise zones.'
However, the main mechanism to increase the spending power and
protect the savings of the British people was to curb inflation. As Letwin
explains, while all governments prefer low inflation, for Thatcher it was
a "central belief" that halting inflation would promote independence in
individuals."'
Fueling worldwide inflation were soaring oil prices. Several countries,
recalls Thatcher, responded by printing money in the hopes of staving off
recession and unemployment. "We had seen in Britain that inflation was
a cause of unemployment rather than an alternative to it, but not everyone
had learned that lesson. "42 In the United States, President Jimmy Carter,
whom Thatcher describes as having "an unsure handle on economics and
36. Interview with Lord Cecil Parkinson, in London (October 15, 1993). Lord
Parkinson served Thatcher as party chairman, Trade and Industry Secretary, Energy
Secretary, and Transportation Secretary.
37. Id.
38. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 148. Unfortunately, to pay for the income tax cuts, she
nearly doubled the Value Added Tax. Id.
39. THATCHER, supra note 11, at 43-44.
40. Id. at 95.
41. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 128.
42. THATCHER, supra note 11, at 67.
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* . .inclined to drift into a futile ad hoc interventionism when problems
arose,"43 imposed a "windfall profits" tax and controls on oil prices.
Thatcher instead insisted at a 1979 G7' meeting in Tokyo that an
unfettered price mechanism was the best way to control consumption and
inflation, a position with which only the Germans agreed.45
Back at home, Thatcher's top priority was to curb inflation by reining
in the money supply. In her 1979 and 1980 budgets, Thatcher slashed
public spending and borrowing, and established strict limits on medium-
term monetary growth.' The results were painful: by the end of her
second year, her government had presided over both the largest collapse
in industrial output since 1921 and a massive rise in unemployment.47
Conditions were so dire that several Cabinet members called for increased
public spending to relax the recession. When asked her intentions by John
Hoskyns, a key economic adviser, she replied, "You know, I would rather
go down than do that, so forget it."4" At a tumultuous party conference,
she answered calls for a U-turn with the dramatic admonition, "Turn if
you like. The lady's not for turning." 9
Instead, Thatcher unveiled a budget with huge public spending cuts.
When a majority of her cabinet opposed the plan, Thatcher responded by
sacking several ministers.5 0 The government neared collapse, with
Thatcher registering in December 1981 a twenty-three percent approval
rating, the lowest in polling history. 5' Only her comfortable margin in
Parliament, and her decision to fire dissenting ministers before they could
plot a leadership coup against her, kept Thatcher in office.
Thatcher's steadfastness paid off. By the winter of 1981-82, the
recession began to ease.52 By maintaining a steady monetary policy,
inflation was reduced to six percent in 1985 (and to an even lower rate
thereafter), government borrowing was brought under control, unemploy-
ment and interest rates fell, and economic growth climbed at a stable
annual rate of three percent.53 Meanwhile, she had established herself
as the unquestioned leader of the Conservative government. Throughout
43. Id. at 68.
44. G7, or the Group of Seven, is comprised of seven major industrial nations and
meets for purposes of conferring on economic policies.
45. THATCHER, supra note 11, at 69-70.
46. Id. at 49-56, 95-97.
47. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 232-33.
48. Id. at 211.
49. Id. at 209.
50. See id. at 218-22.
51. Id. at 241.
52. See id. at 245.
53. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 121-23.
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her tenure, Thatcher would preside over divided cabinets, resisting
constant calls that she change course. However, that same decisive
leadership that the party elite sometimes disdained earned her enduring
support among the Conservative rank-and-file in Parliament.
Meanwhile, Thatcher had to restore order on the labor front. Since
a majority of voters were union members, confrontation with the unions
was considered politically suicidal. Lord Tebbit, one of the principal
architects of Thatcher's union policies, recalls that
[i]t was assumed that she would have to reach some modus
vivendi with the trade union leaders in order to be able to
govern.. .. Heath had been brought down by the trade unions,
[as had] Callaghan .... And so it seemed extraordinary that this
woman would suggest that she could beat them."
Thatcher, though, had perceived that the unions had vastly overplayed
their hand. As Letwin observes, there was "widespread and deeply felt
public demand to be liberated from a tyranny which, apart from its effects
on employees, had made it impossible for Britons to know from one day
to the next what stoppage would produce chaos in their daily life. "55
Thatcher began with systematic reform legislation designed to release
both workers and consumers from union tyranny. Between 1980-86, the
government all but abolished the "closed shop," restoring the voluntary
nature of union membership, and it imposed democratic procedures for
reaching union decisions, created safeguards against union corruption,
limited immunity from damages during strikes, and curbed secondary
boycotts. "Taken together," Letwin notes, "these changes tended to
transform unions by loosening their monolithic structures . . . and to
reshape them as once again voluntary associations of independent-minded
individuals. ,6
But the unions would not easily cede power, and they relentlessly
challenged the government. In 1980, Thatcher responded to a strike at
British Steel with a vow to fight to the end. Though ultimately she agreed
to generous raises after the thirteen week strike, Thatcher's tough rhetoric
established what she deemed a "demonstration effect" that galvanized
public support for later confrontations."
54. Interview with Lord Tebbit, in London (October 21, 1993). Lord Tebbit served
Thatcher as Employment Secretary (1981-83), Trade and Industry Secretary (1983-85), and
party chairman (1985-87).
55. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 157.
56. Id. at 146.
57. See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 195-97.
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An epochal clash came shortly after the 1983 general election, in
which Thatcher won an increased parliamentary majority in the wake of
the Falklands War. She prepared to face down the Marxist head of the
National Union of Mineworkers, Arthur Scargill, by stockpiling coal
reserves and closing excess mines. Scargill responded with strikes and
violence in an effort to bring the government to its knees. Thatcher was
resolute. "There is no week, nor day, nor hour when tyranny may not
enter upon this country, if the people lose their supreme confidence in
themselves, and lose their roughness and spirit of defiance.""8 Thatcher
angrily denounced the Labour Party for allying itself to "the wreckers
against the workers." As for its leader, Neil Kinnock, Thatcher declared:
"[T] here is only one word to describe his policy when faced with threats
from home or abroad, and that word is appeasement."5 9
In the midst of it all, a bomb aimed at killing the prime minister was
detonated by the Irish Republican Army at the hotel where Conservative
leaders were staying for the party conference. Several were killed or
injured, but Thatcher appeared with greater calm and determination than
ever. 60
The incident served to underscore the point she was trying to make
on the labor front. After months of steely confrontation, Thatcher made
a wage deal with the pit deputies' union, which enabled the mines to open
with a makeshift workforce. Soon other miners streamed back to the
mines, and the strike collapsed.6'
Thatcher was seen widely to have stood up, once and for all, to the
unions. As Hugo Young describes it, breaking the strike meant that "the
revolution in attitudes towards trade unions ... [was] nailed firmly into
place. ,62 Having taken on what others considered an unwinnable
confrontation, Thatcher not only cemented her political power but also
established a fundamental rule of law to which there. would no longer be
any exceptions.
VI. Unleashing Free Enterprise
One of the keys to Thatcher's success, Letwin writes, is the image
she conveyed of "continuous revolution," marked by a sense that there
was always "so much more to be done. "63 Unlike the Reagan years in
58. See id. at 366-71.
59. Id. at 372.
60. See id. at 372-73.
61. See id. at 374.
62. Id. at 377.
63. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 41.
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America, in which much of the steam of change dissipated by the second
term, Thatcher constantly was looking to new frontiers. In her third year
in office, before her first re-election, Thatcher appointed nine new policy
committees to apply conservative solutions to areas beyond the
government's initial focus, such as inner cities and families.'
In her political rhetoric, Thatcher focused more on general themes
and principles than specific policy initiatives. For someone advancing a
radical agenda, this approach was wise: once the broad mandate is
created, the government has latitude to pursue policies that may
themselves not be politically popular (such as privatization), but which
will then have a chance to prove themselves. Launching her re-election
campaign, Thatcher sounded the heady, forward-looking theme that would
create her mandate for a second term: "This is a historic election. For the
choice facing the nation is between two totally different ways of life. And
what a prize we have to fight for: no less than the chance to banish from
our land the dark, divisive clouds of Marxist socialism."65
The Conservatives triumphed in June 1983 with a majority of 144,
the largest parliamentary majority since 1945.' By demonstrating her
resolve and by articulating clear and simple themes, Thatcher was able
to claim as much a mandate for her second government as her first.
Still, it is easy to lose sight of core objectives, and Thatcher was wary
of complacency. As she instructs,
the generalized approval is no match for the chorus of
disapproval from the organized minority. The left-wing municipal
socialists and their subsidized front organizations were astute
campaigners, trained and adept at exploiting every weakness of
presentation of the Government's case.67
The only successful antidote was to seize the offensive and maintain it.
She reshuffled her Cabinet to bring in new ideas and energy, surrounding
herself with imaginative thinkers and fellow revolutionaries, and boldly
set forth on a new agenda.68
Much of Thatcher's renewed resolve applied during this period to
reducing government's role in the economy. Early in her tenure, that had
64. See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 329. Thatcher notes that many of the policies
developed during this time actually served as a policy blueprint for her third term. See
THATCHER, supra note 11, at 279.
65. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 323.
66. THATCHER, supra note 11, at 304.
67. Id. at 305.
68. Id. at 306-12.
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meant curbing centralized industrial policy and reducing taxing and
subsidies, but as time went on it extended to more systemic changes in
the role of government at every level. Thus observers such as Peter
Morgan, director of an influential business group, the Institute of
Directors, would say that of all her achievements, "the biggest success
was the exposure of the economy to competition." 69
At the level of central government, this entailed privatizing
nationalized companies and public services. Although privatization hardly
was mentioned in the 1979 campaign, it gradually emerged as a
centerpiece of the Thatcher Revolution. For Thatcher discovered that
privatization was more than an economic strategy; it was, as Letwin
explains, a means "of changing both the reality and the perception of the
relationship between government and the governed." 7"
The concept of "popular capitalism"-the "ownership of shares by
the ordinary man"-was more "a matter of discovery rather than
premeditation for Thatcherites," Letwin observes. But once they
discovered "the underlying social effects of privatization "71-giving
millions of citizens a stake in private enterprises-they pursued it
tenaciously. At first the government approached the matter cautiously,
selling companies such as British Aerospace in 1981.72 By 1986, the
policy was in full swing, with the first privatization of a major public
utility, British Telecom. Initially, the impetus towards widespread
diffusion of share ownership was the desire to generate additional capital
beyond that available from large investors. Hence, shares were made
available at below-market value to employees and consumers. Madsen
Pirie, co-founder of the Adam Smith Institute, explains the strategy:
You would think that if you have to sell eight percent of the
shares at half price ... that would cost money. Of course it
doesn't. It raises the value of the rest of the shares. Because a
company that has workers owning shares is going to have less
striking [and] better industrial relations.
The success of the British Telecom sale prompted other mass
privatizations, including gas, electricity, water, steel, and coal.7a In each,
69. Interview with Peter Morgan, in London (October 19, 1993).
70. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 113.
71. Id. at 102-03.
72. Interview with Colin Robinson, in London (October 13, 1993).
73. Interview with Madsen Pirie, in London (October 19, 1993).
74. For a comprehensive listing of privatizations during the Thatcher years, see David
Marsh, Privatization Under Mrs. Thatcher: A Review of the Literature, 69 PUB. ADMIN. 459,
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public opposition was intense initially, with fear stoked by unions and
others with an interest in preserving the status quo. As Pirie recounts,
however, Thatcher remained resolute: "They'll support it after it's
succeeded." 75
Shares were marketed aggressively not to major investors but to
"Sid," the prototypical average British share-purchaser featured in
television promotions, and his five million friends.76 Privatization was
accompanied by deregulation; in the case of electricity, for example, fixed
prices that led to frequent service interruptions were replaced by supply-
and-demand pricing.77 Other programs, such as stock equity plans,
profit-sharing, and portable pensions, were part of the effort "to promote
personal ownership as a matter of social policy."" Ultimately, explains
Colin Robinson, the IEA's editorial director, share ownership "gives
people a stake in a capitalist economy." 79 Additionally, and not coinci-
dentally, it increases the number of Conservative voters.80
By 1986, popular capitalism was a key component of a broader
program of individual empowerment. John Moore, a businessman and
catalyst for privatization within the Cabinet, declared that
[o]ur programme.., is directed towards three key areas of life:
homes, work-places and the wider community. We are extending
home ownership, increasing employee participation in the
ownership of their companies and spreading the ownership of
public companies to millions of ordinary people .... Possession
means power, the kind of power that matters to ordinary
people-power to make choices, power to control their own
lives. Our aim is to extend this power to as many people as we
can. 81
Along with privatization and deregulation at the level of central
government, Thatcher sought to accomplish the same ends at the local
level. Unlike many American conservatives who harbor nostalgic affection
465 (1991).
75. Interview with Madsen Pirie, supra note 73.
76. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 101.
77. Id. at 100.
78. Id. at 103.
79. Interview with Colin Robinson, supra note 72.
80. The overwhelming majority of first-time share buyers voted Conservative, by a
53% to 14% margin over Labour. See Marsh, supra note 74, at 476.
81. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 102.
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for the bygone era of small-town democracy,82 Thatcher viewed virtually
all local governments as bastions of socialism, dominated by labor unions
and exercising control over education, property, and essential public
services. She slashed their power relentlessly. In 1980, the Local
Government Planning and Land Act gave the Secretary of State authority
to force local governments to sell unused or underused property; over six
years, enough land was sold to enable developers to build 52,000
homes.8 3 Other measures abolished local transit monopolies, forced local
governments to contract out services, and prohibited them from interfering
with competition.84The cornerstone of local privatization, however, was the sale of
government-owned housing, which transformed hundreds of thousands of
renters into property owners. Again, says Letwin, the policy "is not
merely, or even principally, an economic policy. It is a social policy
designed to give erstwhile tenants a new-found sense of independence and
self-sufficiency. " 5
The plan allowed tenants who had rented their units for at least three
years to purchase them at two-thirds of market value, with additional
credit for longer tenancies. The owners had to repay the discount if the
units were sold within five years.86 In sum, over one million families
purchased their homes, transforming them from welfare clients into
mortgage payers. 87 Between 1978 and 1985 the percentage of privately-
owned housing stock increased substantially."8 Since party affiliation in
Britain frequently divides along property lines, housing privatization also
created a new generation of Conservative voters. 89
Education also provided a focus for Thatcher's deregulatory reforms.
By 1979, ninety-three percent of British children attended government
schools. In the 1970s, the Labour government had abolished many of the
academically excellent grammar schools and had herded nearly all the
nation's students into homogenous comprehensive schools. By the late
1970s, the overall quality of British government education was dismal. 9°
Thatcher's aim was to reduce bureaucratic control over government
82. For a critique of this view, see CLINT BOLICK, GRASSROOTS TYRANNY AND THE
LIMITS OF FEDERALISM (1993).
83. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 179.
84. Id. at 178.
85. Id. at 103.
86. Id. at 179.
87. To the Victor These Spoils, ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 1990, at 17, 19.
88. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 180.
89. Polling data showed a "major swing to the Conservatives between 1979 and 1983
among those who bought their council houses." Marsh, supra note 74, at 476.
90. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 228-36.
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schools. She launched a modest school choice program that allowed
families of limited means to send their children to independent schools. 9'
Later she established open enrollment, with funding following each
student; and she deregulated goverment-run schools, giving each school
power over admissions and budgets.92 As in other areas, these education
reforms increased competition and expanded individual autonomy.
One of Thatcher's primary means to restrict the power of local
governments, though, helped lead to her downfall. After several years of
study, Thatcher in 1990 introduced poll taxes (also known as "community
charges") as a new source of local government funds. Previously, local
governments were funded by property taxes that were paid by only about
half the population and redistributed from low-spending to higher-spending
communities. The community charges were imposed on all adults, with
rebates for low-income people, and were assessed in relation to the level
of local government spending. The charges were intended to encourage
fiscal restraint and accountability. However, by imposing new taxes on
people who previously did not pay them, the program was widely
unpopular and eventually repealed. Though the charges were consistent
with the aims of the Thatcher Revolution, for once Thatcher had
miscalculated and embraced a reform that ran counter to her ordinarily
populist strategy. 93 From this mistake Thatcher never recovered.
VII. Resisting the European Leviathan
Thatcher was an ardent free trader, and initially supported greater
economic integration within Europe as a means of bringing down trade
barriers. As the European Commission began unleashing a blizzard of
regulations in the mid-1980s on matters ranging from construction
standards to corporate taxation to professional licensing,94 Thatcher
fought back. "We must ensure that our approach to world trade is
consistent with the liberalisation we preach at home," she declared in a
speech on European federalism at Bruges in 1988. "We have not success-
fully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them
91. Id. at 240-41.
92. Id. at 241-43. Curiously, she also centralized control over curriculum at every
level of education, which was criticized by many of her conservative allies. Id. at 255-74.
In her autobiography, Thatcher confesses error. While the "decentralising features" of her
education policy were "extraordinarily successful," she writes, with respect to the national
curriculum, "I never envisaged that we would end up with the bureaucracy and the thicket
of prescriptive measures which eventually emerged." THATCHER, supra note 11, at 593.
93. For a discussion of the community charges and their political impact, see
THATCHER, supra note 11, at 642-67, 848-49.
94. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 286.
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reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a
new dominance from Brussels."95
Thatcher's "Euroskepticism" was unpopular on both sides of the
political divide since she was thought to be isolating Britain from the
remainder of Europe. Many British citizens, and most of the leadership
elite in both parties, were convinced that only a united economic front
could enable Europe to compete with the United States and Japan on the
trade front. Against this seemingly inevitable and beneficient development,
Thatcher appeared a naysaying reactionary. Eventually her hostility toward
the European Community led to major Cabinet resignations and
contributed to her downfall. 9'
Her warnings did prove prescient, though, as massive new regulations
were imposed from Brussels. Both political leadership and public opinion
subsequently have shifted toward greater skepticism about the benefits of
European federalism and support for the concept of "subsidiarity," the
concept that decisions should be made at the level of government closest
to the people. 97 Having once seemed on the wrong side of history,
Thatcher's concerns now appear to have been vindicated.
VIII.Thatcher's Legacy
Assessments and opinions on Margaret Thatcher vary markedly.
Attempts to objectively measure her success and popularity by economic
indicia and polling data yield conflicting results. The attempt is
treacherous in any event: we cannot know what the situation would look
like if Thatcher had not been elected (though Britain by anyone's standard
was in a debilitating downward spiral at the time), and with the success
of any policy come rising expectations that grow ever more difficult to
fulfil. Yet by any measure, Thatcher's tangible achievements were
substantial; and even more significant are the ways in which she
fundamentally changed British society.
The economic advances wrought during the Thatcher years were
impressive. The top income tax rate was reduced from eighty-three to
95. Id. at 303.
96. In 1990, she vehemently attacked a European Commission report on agricultural
policy, which led one of her closest advisers, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to resign from the
Cabinet, and emboldened Michael Heseltine to announce a challenge to Thatcher's
leadership. Id. at 300. From the emerging conflict, John Major replaced Thatcher as prime
minister.
97. For an analysis of these developments, see CLINT BOLICK, EUROPEAN
FEDERALISM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA (1994).
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forty percent; the basic rate from thirty-three to twenty-five percent.9"
Public spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product decreased
from forty-four percent to less than forty percent, and annual growth in
manufacturing productivity increased at double its previous rate." The
share of the economy attributable to nationalized industries fell from nine
to less than five percent."° Industrial output in major firms-e.g.,
British Steel and British Coal-more than doubled from 1980 to 1990.01
The number of working days lost to strikes plummeted to just over one-
quarter the rate in 1979. 1°
Most significantly, important structural changes permanently altered
the relationship between individuals and the state. By early 1991, over
fifty percent of the public industrial sector had been transferred to the
private sector, moving 650,000 workers from public to private sector
enterprises, in which ninety percent were now shareholders. Overall, nine
million people, twenty percent of the population, were now
shareholders-nearly triple the percentage of the pre-Thatcher years.
Nearly one and a quarter million public housing units were sold to private
owners, most of them former renters. 103
This transformation has been essential to the Thatcher Revolution's
endurance. As Madsen Pirie observes, "The crucial difference between
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan is that Thatcher built into her
reforms the support mechanisms to maintain them." He explains:
In privatizing the state housing, she gave millions of people the
chance to own their own homes, which the Labour Party wasn't
going to confiscate from them again. And in reforming education
she did it on the basis of parental choice, and once they've got
that choice, nobody was going to take it back."°
Likewise, the Labour Party has recanted its blind obedience to labor
unions and its support for nationalization of industry."5 Under its new
leader, Tony Blair, the party in April 1995 deleted from its charter a 77-
year-old commitment to "common ownership of the means of production"
98. A Singular Prime Minister, supra note 4, at 19, 20.
99. To the Victor, supra note 87, at 19 (charts).
100. Marsh, supra note 74, at 463.
101. To the Victor, supra note 87, at 17 (chart). Note, however, that British Steel was
privatized in December, 1988.
102. Id. at 18 (graph).
103. Marsh, supra note 74, at 463.
104. Madsen Pirie, supra note 73.
105. Steve Coil, British Wonder What's Left of the Left, WASHINGTON POST, May
21, 1994, at A14; see also Letwin, supra note 4, at 316-17.
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in favor of equality of opportunity within "the enterprise of the market
and the rigor of competition.""0
By casting her mission not only toward particular reforms but also
as a moral crusade, Thatcher not only destroyed socialism, but also
largely purged it from the hearts and minds of the British people. As
Letwin summarizes it, Thatcherism "changed the conception of what is
true, what is possible and what is desirable."' 7
Still, Thatcher left intact major parts of the welfare state, particularly
the national health service. Even so, an important part of her legacy is the
emerging group of Conservative leaders determined to move the
revolution forward, taking the Thatcher years as merely the starting point.
In the works are privatizations (such as railroads, nuclear power, and the
postal service) that were not even considered during the Thatcher
years,' and. even health insurance and other icons of the welfare state
are in the sights of more ambitious strategists. Lady Thatcher is no longer
prime minister, but her revolution endures.
Conclusion: Lessons of a Revolution
Much of what Thatcher achieved is attributable, of course, to a unique
confluence of time and events, and to her rare leadership qualities. Yet
many of the strategies and insights of the Thatcher Revolution are
transferable to other times and places. I present here my thoughts on some
of the key lessons, beginning with the most important one: Thatcher
demonstrated that ideas matter profoundly. Margaret Thatcher's talent was
not as an intellectual, but rather in recognizing good ideas and applying
them to contemporary problems.
Thatcher distilled these ideas into simple themes that she repeatedly
sounded; around these themes she built popular support, often reaching
across class lines to do so. Constant reference to a clear and coherent
agenda provided both the basis of a governing mandate far more potent
than her parliamentary majority and the standard against which to measure
policy choices and their success. She coined an acronym, TINA-"There
Is No Alternative"-which placed her critics on the defensive."
Throughout her dozen years as prime minister, Thatcher sought
continually to extend the frontiers of her philosophical revolution through
106. Fred Barbash, British Labor Party Cuts Last Tie to Socialism, WASHINGTON
POST, Apr. 30, 1995, at A29.
107. LETWIN, supra note 4, at 309.
108. End of the Line?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1993, at 53-54; see also Barbash, supra
note 106, at A29.
109. See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 153.
Vol. 12:527, 1995
Thatcher's Revolution
the development of new ideas.
From a political perspective, Thatcher demonstrated that adherence
to principle is sometimes more pragmatic than what is perceived as short-
term expediency. Thatcher's experiences during the Heath government
demonstrated, as she puts it, that "the very policies adopted as concessions
to reality were also the least successful." 0 Pressed to engage in a U-
turn in the face of dire economic conditions, Thatcher refused, persisting
in the course she believed right. Unlike most politicians, Thatcher
understood that her government was not an end in itself, but a means to
a greater end. Ultimately, time proved her judgments correct, and-unlike
prior governments that succumbed to pressure-she was ultimately
rewarded with successive victories at the polls. Sound principle and good
politics are not mutually exclusive.
Thatcher also constantly re-invested her political capital. In contrast
to George Bush, who seemed content to coast on his ninety percent
approval rating following the Persian Gulf war, Margaret Thatcher
invested her capital from the Falklands war into an ambitious domestic
agenda. Bush allowed his capital to fritter away, while Thatcher used hers
to reap long-term dividends.
In terms of economic policy, Thatcher demonstrated the efficacy of
low taxes, private enterprise, deregulation, and competition. Even more
significantly, though, she understood that the most important policies are
those that affect the relationship between the individual and the state. The
essence of the success of Thatcherism, I believe, is this: it dramatically
expanded the stake of the British people in freedom.
Politicians on the left generally have been more adept at exploiting
the tactic of changing the relationship between the individual and the state.
Before Thatcher, Labour governments aggressively pursued (and
Conservative governments acquiesced in) efforts to give people a vested
interest in ever-expanding government. Similarly in America, Bill Clinton
ran on a platform consisting of such initiatives as national health
insurance, national service, and industrial policy-all which would have
the result of making people and enterprises more dependent on
government. Once created, these dependencies are not easily reversed.
Yet Thatcher recognized that sometimes special interest groups grow
so large that their interests become either too diffused or too narrow,
separating them from the people they purport to represent. When this
happens, they are vulnerable to being pried apart. The unions in Britain
were a marked example: at their apex, they encompassed fifty-five percent
of British workers, allowing them to cow politicians into submission by
110. THATCHER, supra note 11, at 13-14.
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threatening their electoral demise. At the same time, though, their tactics
of labor unrest and constant demands for wage increases led to
unemployment, disruptions in essential services, and a diminished overall
standard of living. Thatcher recognized this and spoke directly to British
workers, appealing both to their dignity and economic self-interest. Many
of them abandoned their union bosses, enough to confer upon the
Conservatives a governing majority and a mandate for change.
In practice, Thatcherism consisted mainly of curbing inflation,
curtailing the extra-legal power of unions, cutting taxes, and deregulating
and privatizating industry. Each of these dimensions of Thatcherism
transferred power from government or unions to private individuals. In
America, while we do not have the problems that confronted Margaret
Thatcher-union power generally is fairly limited, taxes are not as high
as elsewhere, and we have few nationalized industries-nonetheless,
similar solutions may prove availing. We do have a voracious Regulatory
Welfare State that shackles entrepreneurship and creates perverse
economic incentives. Moreover, Americans are dependent upon govern-
ment in subtle yet profound ways. Candidates for privatization or
increased competitive influences might include public schools, the postal
service, Medicare, numerous local government services, and-political
heresy! -even (or perhaps especially) Social Security.
Finally, there is Thatcher's emphasis, almost alone among modern
political leaders, on the rule of law as the prerequisite for a free society.
In Britain, she applied this principle to bring within the bounds of the law
the unions and large corporations that had governed the country over beer
and sandwiches at Number 10 Downing Street. We in the United States
ought to apply those same boundaries to the state itself, making it live
within its assigned parameters. Britain does not have a written Constitu-
tion, and thus it takes a powerful, dynamic, and radical government to
restore lost liberties; in America it is more a matter of reasserting and
revitalizing constitutional limitations, thereby re-establishing greater
protections for individual autonomy."'
It is ironic that the nation from which America secured independence
more than two centuries ago can today teach us so much about revolution
and freedom. It is a powerful testimony to the leadership of Margaret
Thatcher and the majesty of her revolution that such lessons can be drawn.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995).
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